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Abstract 
Voting is at the heart of a country’s democracy. Assurance in the integrity of the electoral process is pivotal for 
voters to have any trust in the system. Often, electronic voting schemes proposed in the literature, or even 
implemented in real world elections do not always consider all issues that may exist in the environment in which 
they might be deployed. 
In this paper, we identify some real-world issues and threats to electronic voting schemes. We then use the 
threats we have identified to present an analysis of schemes recently used in Australia and Estonia and present 
recommendations to mitigate threats to such schemes when deployed in an untrustworthy environment. 
 




As democracies continue to grow, citizens of a lot of nations, more so in the developing 
countries, are beginning to clamour for the introduction of electronic voting because they 
believe the traditional paper based systems are often marred by wide scale electoral fraud 
(Jensen & Justesen, 2014; Dominguez & James, 1998; Lehoucq, 2003; Craig & Cornelius, 
1995; Heskey & Bowler, 2005)  
One common issue with e-voting schemes is that the environment assumed during design 
may not fully consider the threats that exist in real world deployment. Thus, when these 
schemes are deployed some vulnerabilities may appear that were not considered in the initial 
threat model.  
The voting environment and how voting schemes relate to other parts of the voting process 
goes a long way in determining which security requirements are necessary and which 
requirements may be satisfied by default. For example, a remote voting scheme and a 
supervised in-person voting scheme are two different voting environments and provide 
different levels of security by default. A supervised voting scheme can provide coercion 
resistance by being supervised but remote voting schemes do not give such guarantees by 
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default. Consequently, remote voting schemes need to rely on technical security provided by 
cryptography. 
With electronic voting, voter authentication is an open issue; it can be quite complicated 
authenticating the voter if done remotely. For example, a spouse may vote on behalf of her 
partner and there is no way the system can tell the difference. Some e-voting schemes have 
tried to address this threat by using smartcards (Abandah, Darabkh, Ammari, & Qunsul, 
2014; Springall, et al., 2014) as an instance of the voter. If the smartcard is authenticated as 
done in the Internet voting scheme used in Estonia (Springall, et al., 2014) then the voter is 
assumed to have been authenticated correctly.  
Many voting schemes might work in one environment but might not work in another because 
of socio-economic factors (such as religion, poverty). These factors may determine how 
effective the voting schemes would be in such environments. For example, in a world where 
no one wants to cheat the system, we wouldn’t have to worry about voters being coerced or 
ballot stuffing. 
It is well known that a system is only as secure as the weakest component. In a remote voting 
environment, while the network and servers are secure, there is no assurance that voter’s 
computers are secure. In the Estonian I-voting scheme, voter’s computers were assumed to be 
secure. Subsequently, in a mock election (Springall, et al., 2014), a group of researchers were 
able to attack voters’ computers and change votes to their choice. So, to have assurance that 
the entire voting scheme is secure, the voter’s computer needs to be secure as well.  
Another common assumption made, is the trust placed on electoral officials. In precinct 
voting schemes, we trust electoral officials to correctly authenticate voters and prevent 
double voting (Culnane, Ryan, Steve, & Vanessa, 2015). However, this is not always the case 
in real world elections where the electoral officials may be part of the fraud (Asunka, 
Brierley, Golden, Kramon, & Ofosu, 2013). 
Hence, to build a secure e-voting scheme, security must be considered at the outset and 
designed into the system. Security of all software and hardware should be analysed and 
proved secure if possible, however the level of security also depends on the environment 
where it is deployed.  
In this paper, we identify the security requirements for an e-voting scheme in section 2 and in 
section 3 we analyse threats that exist in the real world. In section 4 we review two well 
known voting schemes, the I-voting scheme used in Estonia and the prêt-a-voter scheme used 
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in Australia, presenting a security analysis of each. We discuss the analysis in section 5 and 
present our conclusions in section 6. 
 
 
2 Security Requirements of an Electronic Voting Scheme 
Electronic voting is more complicated than other electronic transactions such as e-commerce. 
Many of the security requirements required for an electronic voting scheme are not 
necessarily needed in other electronic transactions. Moreover, electronic voting has 
conflicting security requirements which are difficult to resolve, for example verifiability and 
receipt-freeness (Chevallier-Mames, Fouque P, Pointcheval, Stern, & Traoré, 2010) 
Most security requirements for e-voting also apply to traditional paper based voting. 
However, universal verifiability is not satisfied in traditional paper based schemes. Based on 
an analysis of the literature (Schoenmakers, 1999; Delaune, Kremer, & Ryan, 2006; Jan, 
Chen, & Lin, 2001; Karr & Wang, 1999; Fujioka, Okamoto, & Ohta, 1993; Benaloh & 
Tuinstra, 1994; Cramer, Franklin, Schoenmakers, & Yung, 1996; Anane, Freeland, & 
Theodoropoulos, 2007; Burmester & Magkos, 2003) the following describes what we believe 
should be the main security requirements an electronic voting scheme. 
• Coercion Resistance: a coercion resistant scheme prevents a coercer from forcing 
voters to reveal their ballot. 
• Receipt freeness: this property ensures that a voter doesn’t get any information that 
could be used to prove to anyone how he voted. This requirement helps to check vote 
buying and selling. 
• Individual verifiability: this property implies that a voter is able to confirm that their 
vote was cast as intended. 
• Universal Verifiability: in a universal verifiable scheme, anyone can confirm that 
votes have been recorded as cast and counted as cast. 
• Privacy: This requires that the identity of the voter is not revealed. Thus, from a vote 
cast, it should be impossible to identify the voter. This is closely linked with, but 
different from, anonymity which is the unlinkability between the voter’s identity and 
the vote cast. This requirement gives e-voting the ballot secrecy achieved using ballot 
boxes in traditional paper based elections. 
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• Democracy: An electronic voting scheme should ensure only eligible voters can vote 
and they cannot cast multiple votes. 
• Robustness: A robust scheme should be resilient to external attacks such as denial of 
service attacks; should prevent inclusion of votes by corrupt parties for abstained 
voters; and should be able to recover from any faulty behavior due to collusion by 
malicious parties. 
 
2.1 Types of Electronic Voting 
Electronic voting is the communication of votes by electronic means using electronic devices. 
Voting can either be done remotely via the Internet (Internet Voting) or by using a voting 
machine at a precinct which is usually referred to as supervised voting scheme.  
Supervised e-voting schemes are like traditional voting schemes because they make use of 
voting kiosks and are supervised by polling officials. If voting is done remotely or in a voting 
kiosk, it could determine the security requirements satisfied by default.  In a supervised 
environment, polling officers are meant to prevent coercion of voters. In a remote setup, 
schemes try to provide coercion resistance by allowing re-voting as seen in the I-voting in 
Estonia (Springall, et al., 2014). This allows voters to vote manually which supersedes an 
electronic vote (Springall, et al., 2014) and overrides the use of credentials/votes used by a 
coercer (Clarkson, Chong, & Myers, 2008). 
 
3 Threat Analysis in Real World Voting Schemes 
In this section, we consider issues that may affect the integrity of elections in real world 
implementations if not included during the design phase of e-voting schemes. 
 
3.1 Socio-economic Issues 
It has been documented that vote buying and vote selling is very prevalent in real world 
electronic voting. In Mexico, voters were so suspicious about the integrity of elections 
because of the electoral fraud committed by parties (Dominguez & James, 1998). Such fraud 
relied on many techniques including ballot stuffing by both voters and electoral officials; 
stealing of ballot boxes between the polling units and collation centres; intimidation of voters, 
observers and party officials; and manipulating voter’s registration lists (Ferree, Gibson, & 
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Long, 2014; Asunka, Brierley, Golden, Kramon, & Ofosu, 2013; Craig & Cornelius, 1995; 
Heskey & Bowler, 2005).  
Vote buying, selling and coercion is common practice in elections. In an analysis done in 
Taiwan (Nichter S. , 2014) as little as $10 was paid to voters to sell their votes. This is not 
surprising because of the economic situation in many countries, and vote buyers usually 
target poor voters. In the USA five Democratic Party Operatives were convicted in a federal 
court in 2004 for offering poor people cigarettes, medicine, beer and $5 to $10 dollars for 
their votes (Nichter S. , 2008).  
In other cases, electoral officials are part of this electoral fraud. A report about the 2012 
elections in Ghana recorded issues like double voting, under age voting, over voting and 
voting by ineligible individuals (Asunka, Brierley, Golden, Kramon, & Ofosu, 2013). This 
was possible because the poll-site officials were trusted to prevent this. These issues are 
difficult to address solely by human supervision because the trusted polling officials are 
sometimes part of the fraud, usually for financial gain.   
Voting schemes cannot prevent all forms of electoral fraud since there is always a financial 
incentive to cheat the system due to socio-economic challenges. However, design of voting 
schemes should take these threats into account and leverage on technical security wherever 
possible to ensure that any deliberate attempt to circumvent the technology is detected. 
 
3.2 Insider Threat 
According to (Schneier, 2009) “Insiders are especially pernicious attackers because they're 
trusted. They have access because they're supposed to have access. They have opportunity, 
and an understanding of the system, because they use it or they designed, built, or installed it. 
They're already inside the security system, making them much harder to defend against.”  
The UK Cyber strategy also notes that “Computer systems, networks and applications all rely 
upon people for their development, delivery, operation and protection and the likely success 
of an attack is increased when a so-called ‘insider’ is involved” (Cabinet Office, 2009). 
The insider threat is a well-documented issue and one of the biggest threats to organizations. 
About 53% of attacks on organization have been deliberate actions or negligence by staff. 
54% of IT staff feel it is difficult to detect insider threats while 33% of organization have no 
formal response plan (Cole, 2014).  
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Attackers have realized that it is difficult to attack secure networks, so they find easier routes, 
like targeting individuals that work in organizations. An example is the 2011 attack on RSA 
secureID where phishing emails with an attachment that contained malware was sent to a 
group of unsuspecting employees who downloaded the files allowing the attackers to gain 
access to the network1. 
 In e-voting literature, the insider threat and how it could mar an election is not often 
considered. Instead some schemes assume electoral officials can be trusted to carry out vital 
functions such as authentication (Springall, et al., 2014) of voters or transfer of sensitive 
information from one entity (i.e. a server) to another (Culnane, Ryan, Steve, & Vanessa, 
2015). This could have been done more securely by technology. This trust in human 
procedures and processes over technology is an assumption in the I-voting scheme and prêt-
a-voter. 
In an analysis of the electoral process in Estonia (Springall, et al., 2014), researchers recorded 
various lapses in procedures which introduced vulnerabilities that could be exploited. The 
financial benefits for malicious insiders is enough incentive for them to either aid an attack or 
look the other way when this happens.  
With vulnerable electoral officials, it is important to ensure that the technical security 
employed in voting schemes should reduce threats posed by insiders. Hence, auditability of 
the process and verifiability of votes cast should be satisfied for a voting scheme to be 
credible. 
In section 4 we do an analysis of the vVote: a verifiable voting scheme (Prêt-a-voter) and I-
voting scheme to shed more light on this issue. 
 
3.3 Cyberthreat and Foreign Government Influence 
Cyber threat and cyber warfare has become a serious issue that organizations and 
governments are dealing with. There have been various reported cases of state sponsored 
attacks like the alleged North Korean attack on Sony2 or alleged United States attack on 
Iranian nuclear enrichment plant (Langner, 2001). Increasingly we continue to see allegations 
of foreign government influence in the democratic processes of other nations.  
                                                 
1  http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/RSAs-SecurID-Breach-Started-with-Phishing-Email-318649 
2 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/287beee4-96a2-11e4-a83c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3h4p5qypf 
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In addition to the current controversy surrounding recent elections in the USA, it has been 
alleged that Russia carried out a state sponsored Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack 
on Estonia in 20073. In Hong Kong, the largest and most sophisticated ever DDoS attack hit 
an online democracy poll that canvassed opinions for future elections in the country4. Also, in 
Ukraine a virus that was meant to delete votes during the presidential elections hit their 
Central Election Authority5. 
In Washington DC, an Internet voting system was designed to allow oversea absentee voters 
cast their votes, this was a pilot project and it was tested as a mock election in 2010. Some 
researchers (Wolchok, Wustrow, Isabel, & Halderman, 2012) attacked this system and gained 
full access within 48 hours, changing every vote and revealing almost all secret ballots. 
These Cyber-attacks have created a completely different threat environment that did not exist 
before, and now that nations are pushing for e-voting this should be considered when 
designing e-voting schemes. 
In the literature, many schemes don’t consider the threat of a cyber-attack. In the I-voting 
scheme used in Estonia, lapses where shown in the electoral process and architecture that 
could create avenue for a cyber-attack (Springall, et al., 2014). The implicit trust placed on 
voters’ computers in some Internet voting schemes clearly shows that cyber threat was not 
considered in their design. 
 
3.4 Threat Model 
Based on the review in the previous section and sections 4.3 and 4.4 we present a threat 
model in Table 1 and make some assumptions about the attacker. We do not consider all the 
threats that exist in e-voting, only threats we believe are most important.  
 
 
Threat Vulnerability Impact Scheme 
Poll-site 
officials  
Trust placed on poll-site 
officials to authenticate 
voters using traditional 
Votes are cast for 
abstained voters without 
being detected by the 
Pret-a-voter 
                                                 
3 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia 
4 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/06/23/most_sophisticated_ddos_strikes_hk_democracy_poll/ 
5  http://www.rt.com/news/161332-ukraine-president-election-virus/ 
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vote on behalf 
of abstained 
voters. 
means as used in paper 
based elections. 
Ballots are not 
authenticated hence not 
digitally linked to voter. 
system and could change 
the outcome of the 
election. 
An attacker can 




Ballots are not digitally 




Double voting by 
legitimate voters. 
Ballot stuffing by poll-site 
officials without being 
detected and could change 






Trust placed on officials 
over technical means to 
authenticate (i.e 
Biometrics) voter. 
Ineligible people can cast 




An attacker can 
install a vote 







Unclean computers used to 
prepare voting client 
software sent to voters. 
Attacker alters votes to 
that of his choosing 
without being detected. 
Spyware monitors how 
voters voted, breaking 
ballot secrecy and could 
enforce voter coercion. 
I-Voting 
Vote selling to 
coercers by 
voters. 
Trust placed on voter to 
tear candidate list that links 
ballot to voter. 
Voter can leave poll-site 
with candidate list and 
show a third party there 










Improper input validation. 
Disruption of electoral 




Table 1. Threat Model 
 
 
3.4.1 Capability of the Attacker 
In this section, we make some assumptions about the attacker based on our threat model 
• An attacker can either be an insider or an outsider. 
• An attacker may be motivated by financial incentives to cheat the electoral process.  
• A voter may be motivated by financial incentives to cheat the electoral process 
• We assume that an attacker has the following capabilities: 
1. An attacker can stuff the ballot box without being detected. 
2. An attacker can vote on behalf of an abstained voter or allow ineligible voting. 
3. An attacker has adequate resources to carry out a DDoS attack 
4. An attacker can tell the link between a voter’s id and the cast ballot. 
5. An attacker can install vote altering, or data stealing malware in election servers 
and voters’ computers. 
 
4  Electronic Voting Scheme 
In the previous section we identified threats to e-voting schemes in the real world. In this 
section, we now review two electronic voting schemes in the light of the threats and 
requirements discussed earlier. 
 
4.1 vVote: A Voter Verifiable Voting Scheme (Prêt-a-voter)  
The prêt-a-voter voting scheme is an end-to-end verifiable scheme that provides privacy. It 
uses a candidate list which is printed on demand before voting. This candidate list has the 
names of candidates arranged in a random order. The voter can audit this candidate list to 
confirm that it has the correct encryption of the random arrangement of the candidates. If this 
audit is done, the candidate list is decrypted and hence cannot be used to cast a vote to 
maintain the secrecy of the ballot (Burton, Culnane, & Schneider, 2015). A QR code of the 
candidate list is scanned into a tablet and this launches the vote capture application. The voter 
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fills the ballot using the tablet. After completing the ballot, a preference receipt (PR) is 
printed. The voter can compare the candidate list with the preference receipt to confirm that 
they are both arranged in the same order, this gives the voter assurance that his vote has been 
cast as intended. The candidate list is expected to be destroyed after confirmation, to maintain 
ballot secrecy while the preference receipt is kept by the voter. At the end of the elections, a 
voter uses the preference receipt to confirm that his vote has been published on a Web 
bulletin board at the final tally. This gives voters assurance that their votes have been 
recorded as cast (Burton, Culnane, & Schneider, 2015). Further details could be found in the 
draft report (Culnane, Ryan, Steve, & Vanessa, 2015) 
 
4.2 Estonia Internet Voting System (I-voting) 
Over 30% of votes cast in elections done in Estonia today are done electronically this makes 
Estonia one of the front runners in the use of electronic voting for elections and the first 
country to use Internet voting nationally (Springall, et al., 2014). Estonia has a national ID 
card which has cryptographic keys issued by the government which are used to authenticate 
voters during election. The scheme attempts to replicate the double envelope process used in 
postal voting. A digital signature is generated with the voter’s signing key and this is used to 
provide the voter’s identity (outer envelope). The system’s public encryption key is used to 
encrypt the ballot to provide secrecy (the inner envelope). The signature is stripped from the 
ballot leaving a set of anonymous encrypted votes once the eligibility of all voters has been 
established. These anonymous votes are then transferred to a physically separate vote 
counting server connected to a hardware security module for decryption. 
The Estonian voting system uses a vote forwarding server which is the only publicly 
accessible server. This server communicates with the client software and forwards vote to a 
vote storage server. Votes are copied using DVDs to the vote counting server by electoral 
officials. The vote counting server is not connected to any server. The Estonian Internet 
voting system is not end-to-end verifiable and much of security it provides relies on human 
procedures rather than technical means thereby placing lot of trust on electoral officials. 
Further details about how this voting scheme really works can be found in (Heiberg & 
Willemson, 2014, Springall, et al., 2014). 
 
ANALYSIS OF ELECTRONIC VOTING SCHEMES IN THE REAL WORLD  
 
 
4.3 Security Analysis of vVote: A Verifiable Voting Scheme (Prêt-a-voter) 
Prêt-a-voter, used in Australia, relies on traditional means to validate eligibility (Democracy 
see section 2). If this scheme is to be adopted in other environments, this may not work since 
part of the reason why nations clamour for electronic voting is the inadequacies of traditional 
means of authenticating voters. As stated in our threat model, relying on poll-site officials to 
authenticate voters could leave the system vulnerable to ineligible voting. This risk could be 
mitigated using Photo ID but cannot be eliminated by this approach alone especially if the 
polling officials are untrustworthy. 
This scheme expects voters to destroy the human readable candidate’s list after casting their 
votes, this puts a huge level of trust on voters to do this. Privacy is an important requirement 
of e-voting as well as receipt freeness which helps to mitigate vote buying, vote selling and 
voter coercion. If voters fail to destroy this human readable part, which isn’t unthinkable 
considering the socio-economic challenges (Section 3.1), then this scheme would not provide 
privacy. Because with this candidate list you can make a link between the candidates and vote 
cast published on the bulletin board as highlighted in our threat model is section 3.4. 
Furthermore, with the candidate list, voters have proof to show a vote buyer or a coercer. 
Thus, this scheme would fail to provide coercion resistance (section 2) and gives voters the 
opportunity to sell their votes to vote buyers. 
Ballot stuffing, double voting and voting in place of abstained voters could go a long way in 
determining who wins an election and has been reported in several elections, an example is 
the 2012 national elections held in Ghana (Asunka, Brierley, Golden, Kramon, & Ofosu, 
2013).  
The prêt-a-voter scheme is as vulnerable to corrupt official as traditional schemes and this 
needs to be mitigated using technical means. A corrupt official could vote for an abstaining 
voter and this wouldn’t be detected by the system because of unlinkability between voter and 
the ballot cast; and lack of technical means for authentication. Schemes like the I-voting in 
Estonia solve this problem by using a smartcard which is an instance of the voter. This link 
prevents corrupt officials from voting for abstained voters without physically having their 
smartcards. Prêt-a-voter system is meant to be end-to-end verifiable but the attacks 
mentioned cannot be detected by the system and represent a big risk to take in certain 
environments.  Hence, considering insider threats and socio-economic issues like poverty, 
prêt-a-voter may not offer any better security than traditional schemes.   
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However, prêt-a-voter would improve efficiency and minimize human errors in the vote 
counting process and if we could guarantee that the electoral officials and voters are 
trustworthy then it may well satisfy its security claims but this is easier said than done in the 
real world. 
In conclusion, prêt-a-voter is vulnerable to breach of privacy, vote buying and selling since 
achieving receipt-freeness relies on voters being trustworthy, ballot stuffing, ineligible voting 
is possible if trust assumptions are broken. 
 
4.4 Analysis of Estonian Internet Voting Scheme 
A group of researchers observed the Estonian elections and produced a report which showed 
lapses in the electoral process that could undermine the integrity of the election. One of the 
issues raised was the use of procedural means over more technical means to provide security. 
A high degree of trust, as seen in prêt-a-voter system, was placed on electoral officials, 
making security critical aspects of the system rely on, sometimes, a single individual. Trust 
was also placed on the integrity of voters’ computers as well as the various servers used. We 
will consider some of these lapses to support our argument but a full report on this election 
can be found in (Springall, et al., 2014).  
Contrary to security best practices electoral officials logged on to servers using root access. 
This is a major lapse because the system cannot tell which official accessed it. This creates an 
opportunity for a malicious insider to carry out attacks such as installing malware that could 
alter votes between decryption and tabulation, or stealing information that could compromise 
vote privacy as highlighted in our threat model in section 3.4  
It was also observed that the vote storage server reported an error suggesting that the drive 
configuration had changed when it was booting during the tabulation phase. Instead of the 
officials investigating this error, it was simply bypassed in this critical phase of the election 
where encrypted votes are exported. In other instances, servers were simply rebooted to clear 
error messages rather than troubleshooting. If these errors were caused by malware, the 
officials would not have noticed. And since the system is not end-to-end verifiable, voters 
and auditors cannot tell if votes are counted as cast in the final tally. 
It was also documented that officials downloaded client software using an unsecure http 
connection. This makes the system vulnerable to a network man-in-the-middle attack which 
could compromise the election. Unclean laptops that had links to gambling sites and bit 
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torrents installed were used to prepare client software distributed to the public, this could 
introduce malware into voter’s computers (section 3.4) on a large scale. Most attacks on 
organizations are carried out because unsuspecting insiders are targets of cyber attackers. So 
even if the electoral officials are not genuinely part of the electoral fraud, their actions as 
have just been highlighted leaves the electoral process vulnerable to attacks.  
In the Estonian system, a voter can verify with an application (Springall, et al., 2014) that 
their vote was cast as intended. However, with the increasing interaction between smart 
phones and computers it is not difficult to imagine that both devices can be corrupted making 
it difficult for the voter to notice that their votes have been altered. 
In the tabulation phase, it was also reported that a technical glitch occurred and an official’s 
personal flash drive, that contained other personal files, was used to copy unencrypted votes 
to a laptop connected to the internet where the official result was signed. If this USB 
contained malware, this would mean the votes could have been altered without detection. 
Furthermore, the flash drive could have introduced malware to the counting server, this 
malware could be a spyware which could have the ability to monitor the decryption process 
and hence know the relationship between a voter and a ballot- breaching voter’s privacy. 
These possibilities were identified in our threat model in section 3.4. 
From the published portions of the I-voting server software the researchers found out that the 
log server, which logs information from the vote forwarding and vote storage servers, saved 
any unexpected data to disk. If this storage gets exhausted voting would stop allowing a 
denial of service attack Such an attack is well within the means of the state sponsored 
attacker or even a modest attacker with adequate resources (section 3.4) depending on the 
size of the disk. Furthermore, storing of unexpected data means the system is vulnerable to 
other attacks. 
In conclusion, we can see that this scheme is vulnerable to many attacks such as DDoS, 
breach of privacy, and vote alteration. Some of these attacks are possible because the scheme 
is not universally verifiable (section 2) and trust was placed on human procedures and 
processes rather than technical security. 
 
5 Discussion 
It is clear that while existing e-voting schemes may be secure in benign environments, their 
adoption for use in untrustworthy environments presents a number of risks. In section 3, we 
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identified the threats to e-voting schemes and how these could impact security. In this 
section, we do a further analysis on the schemes considered in section 4, highlighting the 
motivation for the attacker, vulnerabilities that could be exploited and some ways to mitigate 
the threats. 
 
Authentication: In the prêt-a-voter scheme, we have shown that trust placed on electoral 
officials may allow ineligible voters vote, over voting and voting on behalf of abstained 
voters. These vulnerabilities could be prevented by the introduction of a tamper-resistant 
token, such as a smartcard which is difficult to clone. With smartcards voters can be 
authenticated correctly preventing ineligible voters from voting. Such a device could also 
sign ballots ensuring linkability between the voter’s id and cast ballot. Linkability would 
ensure officials cannot vote for absent voters without the smartcard in their possession, 
preventing ballot stuffing.  
However, the use of smartcards comes at an extra cost and the added advantage of 
introducing a smartcard may not be justified. The Estonian National ID card which has 
cryptographic keys for both authentication and digital signature adequately addresses the 
issue of ballot stuffing and voter’s authentication. There also exist other electronic voting 
schemes that use smartcards for authentication of voters (Langner, 2001), prevention of 
double voting and impersonation of abstained voters (Abandah, Darabkh, Ammari, & 
Qunsul, 2014). 
 
Incentives: In the prêt-a-voter scheme, the trust placed on voters creates an opportunity for 
vote buying, vote selling and coercion because of the possibility of voters carrying the human 
readable candidate list out of the polling booths. This means receipt-freeness, which 
underpins privacy and coercion-resistance, relies on voters who may not always be 
trustworthy.  We have shown that considering the socio-economic issues in societies, there is 
an incentive for voters and electoral officials to partake in corrupt electoral practices. In many 
environments, a voting system cannot rely solely on trustworthy voters or electoral officials 
but should rather rely on technical measures for security sensitive processes. 
 
In the I-voting scheme, the procedural lapses highlighted in section 4.4 creates an avenue for 
a malicious insider to infect voter’s computers on a large scale. Personal devices should not 
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be used to prepare client software sent to voters. Special purpose laptops or PCs dedicated to 
this task should be used. Moreover, the integrity of any software should be checked at 
intervals to ensure that the client software has not been tampered with.  
 
Verifiability: The I-voting scheme places trust on the voter’s client machine. Malware can be 
introduced to the system by taking advantage of procedural lapses highlighted in section 4.4 
above. This kind of attack would go unnoticed by voters and auditors because the scheme is 
not end-to-end verifiable (verifiability section 2). Trust was placed on the voter’s client 
machine, human process and procedures to prevent this. Our argument is that such trust is 
misplaced, thus verifiability is difficult to guarantee. 
Further attacks on the I-voting system were carried out on both the client side and server side 
affecting ballot secrecy and voter’s privacy (Springall, et al., 2014). The prêt-a-voter scheme, 
however, is end-to-end verifiable from vote casting to the final count and tallying of results. 
Any vote alteration would be detected both by voters and third parties because this scheme 
relies on sound security practices to provide verifiability rather than relying on human 
processes and procedures.  
 
Cyber Attacks: We have shown that Cyber-attacks by well-resourced attackers or state 
sponsored attackers are a threat to electronic voting which did not exist in traditional paper 
based schemes. The DoS attack that could stop voting in the I-voting scheme by exploiting 
data logging (see section 4.4) can be prevented by ensuring proper validation of input data.  
Furthermore, the use of unclean laptops to prepare client software sent out to voters creates 
an avenue for wide scale malware infection of voters’ computers. This kind of vulnerability 
could leave the entire e-voting process vulnerable to a full scale cyber-attack. In the pret-a-
voter scheme the voting is done in a more controlled environment since elections are done in 
a precinct and all the equipment used are under the control of the electoral authorities. 
 
Technical Security vs Human Procedures and Processes: Many technical solutions to 
ID verification rely on PINs or passwords. These may be stolen, or shared. Alternatively, a 
physical token could be issued that generates temporary passwords or PINs. This gives an 
extra level of security because even if PINs have been compromised an attacker would still 
require a physical token to make use of that information. We argue that the cost of issuing 
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such tokens may be justified depending on the environment where the e-voting scheme is 
deployed. 
 
We have shown from both schemes analysed, that the part of the scheme where technical 
means are used to provide security and the kind of trust assumptions made could determine 
which security requirements would be satisfied. In the prêt-a-voter scheme, from vote casting 
to the final vote tallying is end-to-end verifiable but the Estonian Internet Voting scheme is 
not.  
 
This gap in technical verifiability between authentication and vote casting in prêt-a-voter, and 
in the I-voting scheme between vote casting and vote tallying, introduces weakness which 
could be exploited by an attacker as discussed in sections 4.3 and 4.4.  
 
In the prêt-a-voter scheme authentication was undertaken by traditional means since it is a 
supervised scheme, this is a sharp contrast from the I-voting scheme which used a smartcard 
to authenticate voters. The lack of technical authentication in pret-a-voter creates the 
opportunity for electoral officials to cheat the system as discussed in section 4.3 without 
being detected.  
 
On the other hand, the trust placed on voters to destroy the human readable part of the prêt-a-
voter ballot form used to verify votes are cast as intended, creates another vulnerability that 
could be exploited by voters to break ballot secrecy and sell votes. In the I-voting scheme, a 
verification app on a smart phone is used to check that votes have been cast as intended. 
However, in this scheme, a coercer can watch a voter while voting. This could be mitigated 
by a re-voting option to override any coerced vote. In cases where the voter is corrupt, no 
technology can prevent the voter from selling votes or allowing someone vote in his stead 
because this scheme is not supervised.  
In conclusion, both e-voting schemes reviewed have advantages and disadvantages in terms 
of meeting the requirements for a secure e-voting scheme. However, neither scheme is able to 
meet all requirements. In particular, we have identified two issues that need to be addressed if 
e-voting schemes are to be used in untrustworthy environments. Firstly, methods to mitigate 
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threats posed by insiders are required; and secondly robust methods to authenticate the voter 
needs to be addressed. These issues need to be considered in any practical implementation of 
voting schemes if they are to be widely deployed. 
 
6  Conclusion 
Electronic voting systems are beginning to move from the lab to be deployed in the real 
world. Such systems have many potential benefits, however, at this stage there are some 
impediments that may leave the systems vulnerable in an untrustworthy environment.  
 
In section 2 we presented a set of requirements that, if met, will overcome these impediments. 
We used these requirements to analyse two e-voting schemes that have recently been used in 
real elections and to consider how they would fare in an untrustworthy environment. Based 
on our analysis these schemes we saw the difficulty in preventing coercion resistance, vote 
buying and vote selling in the remote voting scheme – since a voter can be monitored whilst 
voting, or voted on behalf of. And with supervised voting schemes, we cannot always rely on 
traditional means and electoral officials to adequately authenticate voters. 
 
We argue that in order to be deployed in less benign environments, e-voting schemes should 
be end-to-end verifiable right from authentication of voters to the tallying of votes. Fewer 
trust assumptions need to be made and less trust placed on voters, electoral officials and 
observers. 
 
We appreciate that it is highly unlikely that voting schemes would completely eliminate 
human procedures and processes since security cannot be achieved by technology alone. 
However, we argue that where security could be provided by technological means, then this 
should be leveraged wherever possible in the electoral process. 
 
We are currently investigating the use of smartcards and biometrics for authentication in 
supervised electronic voting schemes and the cost implications. We are also looking at end-
to-end verifiable schemes using mix-networks to provide anonymity. We will also be 
investigating a means of providing individual verifiability whilst still satisfying receipt-
freeness. 
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